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deceased and no longer available to clarify their intentions or perspectives. However, after 
the 2008 Supreme Court of Canada decision, FH v McDougall (“McDougall”), it was 
resolutely pronounced that only two standards of proof operate in Canada, with the third 
standard of proof dismissed for the practical problems of its application. As conceded 
below, there are compelling and valid reasons to disregard a third standard of proof for 
typical will challenges investigating circumstances such as the execution of the will or the 
testamentary capacity of the testator. This paper argues that for challenges that involve 
allegations of moral guilt, and in cases of fraud or undue influence over the testator, then 
something more than a balance of probabilities is desirable, and the more demanding third 
standard of proof should be utilized. 
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A H ISTORY OF  PREFERENTIAL  SHARE IN  ONTARIO :  
INTESTACY LEGISLAT ION AND CONCEPTIONS OF   
THE  DESERVING OR UNDESERVING WIDOW 
Louise M. Mimnagh* 
ABSTRACT 
Ontario’s current method for trying to ensure the fair distribution of an intes-
tate’s estate, or the estate of an individual without a valid Last Will and 
Testament, is outlined in the Succession Law Reform Act. Specifically, section 
45(1) outlines the foundational concept of a “preferential share,” which enti-
tles the surviving spouse to a prescribed financial interest in the estate which 
is prioritized above all other heirs.  
The concept of a preferential share stands in sharp contrast with histor-
ical English common law methods of devolving intestate estates in which 
legal entitlements were heavily influenced by an individual’s gender and mari-
tal status. In light of the historical influence of gender and marital status on 
intestacy legislation, this paper investigates the origins and development of 
the preferential share provision. This paper uses an analytical framework em-
phasizing the historically gendered experiences of widows and widowers, and 
how their gender informed the nature of their legal interests under intestacy. 
In addition, this essay frames its analysis within historical commentary that 
demonstrates a sharp conceptual dichotomy between the “good wife and de-
serving widow” or the “bad wife and undeserving widow,” and how such 
categorization impacted perceptions of what a fair and reasonable devolution 
entailed. 
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 1. 
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Introduction 
The practice of writing a Last Will and Testament has been described as an expres-
sion of “self-assertion,” or a means to maintain influence over one’s property after 
death.1 However, passing away intestate has been a common historical occurrence, and 
approximately half of adult Canadians do not have a will.2 In Ontario, the current 
method for trying to achieve a fair and reasonable devolution of an intestate’s estate is 
outlined within Part II of the Succession Law Reform Act.3 Specifically, section 45(1) out-
lines the foundational concept of a “preferential share,” or the surviving spouse’s 
entitlement to a base financial interest in the estate, valued up to the preferential share, 
which is assigned in “preference” to the spouse above all other heirs.4 
The Succession Law Reform Act is a relatively modern piece of legislation, which came 
into force in 1977 under Bill Davis’ minority Ontario Progressive Conservative gov-
ernment. Historically, the concept of a “preferential share” stands in sharp contrast with 
English common law methods of devolving intestate estates, including the customs of 
primogeniture, dower, or curtesy, in which legal entitlements were heavily influenced by 
an individual’s gender and marital status. 
This essay investigates the origins and development of the preferential share provi-
sion in Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act. In light of the historical influence of gender 
and marital status on intestacy provisions, this paper uses an analytical framework em-
phasizing the historically gendered experiences of widows and widowers, and how their 
gender informed the nature of their legal interests under intestacy. In addition, this essay 
frames its analysis within historical commentary that suggests a sharp conceptual di-
chotomy between the “good wife and deserving widow” or the “bad wife and 
undeserving widow,” and how such categorization impacted perceptions of what a fair 
and reasonable devolution entailed. 
This essay therefore proceeds through (1) a review of the gender-based analysis this 
essay employs; (2) a historical review of the differing legal personalities of wives and 
widows under the common law; (3) an assessment of traditional common law measures 
for the devolution of an intestate’s estate; (4) an evaluation of the discontent with these 
traditional measures; (5) an in-depth review of preferential share’s introduction in 1895; 
(6) a critique of these reforms and how they impacted vulnerable subgroups of wives 
and widows; and (7) a brief review of the modern exclusion of common-law spouses 
under this legislation. Finally, this essay closes with general conclusions on preferential 
share as a fundamental conceptual shift regarding intestate estate distribution, which 
pioneered other important reforms in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Phyllis Palgi & Henry Abramovitch, “Death: A Cross-Cultural Perspective” (1984) 13 Annual Review of 
Anthropology 358 at 407. 
2 Canadian Press and Leger Marketing, Canadians and Death (2002), online: DocStoc 
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/74884846/Canadians-and-Death> at 2. 
3 Succession Law Reform Act, SO 1977, c 40, s 45(1) [SLRA 1977]. 
4 Ibid. 
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1. FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 
A Gender-Based Analysis 
Although the Succession Law Reform Act outlines preferential share in terms of 
“spouses,” as Ontario has only recently recognized same-sex partnerships, a historical 
review of intestacy cannot proceed in the same gender-neutral manner.5 This analysis 
therefore predominantly occurs in a historical context of exclusively heterosexual un-
ions, and where one’s gender fundamentally altered the experience of both matrimony 
and widowhood. 
In order to appreciate the influence of gender on widowhood and intestacy provi-
sions, this historical examination embraces a “Gender-Based Analysis” framework. Such 
a framework “recognizes that the realities of women’s and men’s lives are different” due 
to the phenomenon of culturally specific gender roles.6 A gender-based framework 
therefore provides insight into the dynamic and distinct experiences of husbands and 
wives, or widowers and widows, in an era that the husband held “the purse, the sword, 
and the plow handle,” and where a widow would suddenly find herself removed from 
her husband’s traditional authority and coverture upon her husband’s death.7 
2. GENDERED EXPERIENCES UNDER THE LAW 
From Wife to Widow: The Death and Resurrection of a Woman’s Legal  
Personality 
Under the common law doctrines of marital unity and coverture, a woman’s legal 
personality would undergo a dramatic transformation upon marriage: as a wife, a wom-
an would be legally classified as a feme covert, or one who has her legal existence 
suspended, merged or “covered” by her husband.8 Sir William Blackstone, writing in 
1765, famously described this transformation: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very be-
ing or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at 
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose 
wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing.9 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990 c S26, s 1(1) [SLRA 1990]. With “spouse” as describing two persons, 
rather than a “man and wife;” Same-sex marriages were not effectively recognized in Ontario until 2003 via 
Halpern v Canada (2003), 225 DLR (4th) 529, 65 OR (3d) 201 (Ont CA) [Halpern]. 
6 Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, “Gender-Based Analysis Policy” (Ottawa: 1999, 
2006) at 4-5, online: Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/plc_1100100028538_eng.pdf>. 
7 Joel T Rosenthal, “Fifteenth-Century Widow and Widowhood: Bereavement, Reintegration and Life Choic-
es” in Sue Sheridan Walker, ed, Wife and Widow in Medieval England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1993) ch 2 at 34. 
8 Ibid at 3.  
9 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) at 430. 
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As a feme covert, a wife’s real property, land, and income from both labour and gifts 
would immediately be transferred to her husband’s control, and the common law histor-
ically only recognized the husband as an agent before the law.10 Feminist authors have 
therefore described coverture as a “civil death,” or the “obliteration of the legal personali-
ty of the wife.”11  
If a wife’s legal personality experienced a “civil death” at marriage, it was resurrect-
ed at the time of her husband’s death. As a widow, a woman would return to a legal 
standing parallel to any other single female. She was legally classified as a feme sole, or a 
“woman who enjoyed a full legal personality,” with nearly all the civil rights of a man 
outside of suffrage, including the ability to own property through purchase or inher-
itance, and bequeath or devise her property through a will.12 
3. INTESTACY UNDER COMMON LAW AND STATUTE 
Traditional Measures for the Devolution of Intestate Estates 
An intestate’s estate was traditionally managed through the common law or legisla-
tive provisions. Consequently, intestate legislation has been described as a “second best 
law,” or the “poor man’s will,” as it attempted to provide a fair and reasonable devolu-
tion of the intestate’s estate.13 Yet as outlined above, one’s gender, when combined with 
marital status, was a potent indicator of an individual’s legal standing, and also played a 
critical role in determining one’s legal relationship with an intestate spouse’s estate. 
The basis of intestacy provisions are also linked to the common law’s concerns 
around the doctrine of bona vacantia, or “ownerless goods.” This doctrine is based upon 
the common law theory that “all property must vest in someone at all times without 
interruption,” or otherwise be claimed by the Crown.14 As a result, intestacy provisions 
existed before the creation of the modern will to prevent property from being classified 
as bona vacantia by ensuring it was immediately vested in the deceased’s relatives.15 
The Right of Primogeniture 
At common law, primogeniture addressed the issue of bona vacantia under intestacy 
by devolving the estate to the “heir-at-law,” with priority being granted to the eldest 
son. The doctrine is often associated with the aristocracy of England and attempted to 
prevent fragmentation of substantial family estates. Yet authors in the nineteenth centu-
ry, such as Eyre Lloyd, argued that this “natural desire of Englishmen to perpetuate land 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Lori Chambers, Married Women and the Law of Property in Victorian Ontario (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 
1997) ch 1 at 18-19; Nancy E Wright, “‘The Lady Vanishes:’ Women and Property Rights in Nineteenths-
Century New South Wales” in John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property 
Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) ch 9 at 192.  
11 Chambers, supra note 10 at 15, 14. 
12 Sue Sheridan Walker, Wife and Widow in Medieval England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993) 
introduction at 3; Chambers, supra note 10 at 14-15. 
13 CH Sherrin & RC Bonehill, The Law and Practice of Intestate Succession (London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 
2004) at 4. 
14 CED (Ont 4th), vol 18, title 44 “Crown II.4.(c)” at §42 (WL Can). 
15 WD MacDonald, Fraud on the Widow’s Share (Michigan: University of Michigan Law School, 1960) at 39-40. 
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in their families” was prevalent throughout all classes in the Christian Commonwealth.16 
Writing in 1877, Lloyd also dismissed any concerns around primogeniture by casually 
estimating that it only directed the transfer of two percent of land each year, and “could 
have no appreciable effect upon the descent of the bulk of property.”17  
Despite Lloyd’s estimations, when combined with the nature of feme covert, and pro-
visions that maternal ancestors would not inherit from an intestate until “all paternal 
ancestors and their descendants had failed,” primogeniture greatly reduced the likeli-
hood of a woman coming to hold property.18 Likewise, while John A. MacDonald 
praised the doctrine in 1845 for promoting the enterprise of younger sons, he failed to 
recognize that this tradition could threaten both the widow and younger children of 
both sexes with destitution—absent the good will of the eldest son.19  
A Widow’s Right to Dower 
A widow’s right to her “dower” was therefore an important counterbalance to the 
male heir-at-law nature of primogeniture, and was a custom born out of the husband’s 
responsibility for his wife’s maintenance after his passing. Under common law, dower 
attached to the land at the moment of marriage, and its purpose was twofold: to fulfil a 
husband’s personal responsibility to secure his wife against his heirs and creditors; and 
to fulfil a public obligation to prevent a widow of lesser means from “becoming a public 
liability.”20 Beyond its common law roots, a widow’s right to dower appeared in chapter 
7 of the Magna Carta of 1215 and was to be obtained sometime during her “Right of 
Quarantine,” which referred to her ability to “remain in her husband’s house for forty 
days after his death.”21  
The specific nature of a widow’s dower was outlined in the Dower Act of 1297, as 
“the third part of all the lands of her husband which were his during his lifetime, save 
when she was dowered with less at the church door.”22 Therefore, her dower was a life 
estate in either one third or one half of her husband’s personal estate, depending on 
whether children or “issue” had been born by the couple.23  
However, under statute, this traditional safety net had new conditions attached—
conditions that were closely linked to conceptions of the “good wife” and its equivalent 
of the “deserving widow.” The legislation that added these conditions was the Statute of 
Westminster II of 1285, which stated that a widow would be subject to disqualification 
from her dower if she were adulterous.24 Under common law, adultery was not a bar to 
                                                                                                                                            
16 Eyre Lloyd, The Succession Laws of Christian Countries: With Special Reference to the Law of Primogeniture as it Exists 
in England (London: Stevens and Haynes, 1877), ch 1 at 1. 
17 Ibid at 2. 
18 Sherrin, supra note 13 at 33. Citing the Inheritance Act, 1833 (UK) 3 & 4 Will IV c 106, s 7.  
19 AR Buck, “‘This Remnant of Feudalism:’ Primogeniture and Political Culture in Colonial New South-Wales, 
with Some Canadian Comparisons” in McLaren, Buck & Wright, supra note 10, ch 8 at 180; MacDonald, supra 
note 15 at 59-60.  
20 Wright, supra note 10 at 190; Lilias M Toward, Dower and Curtsey: A Study Paper (Nova Scotia Law Reform 
Advisory Commission, 1973) at 2. 
21 Magna Carta, 1215 (UK), c 7; Toward, supra note 20 at 2. 
22 Dower Act, 1297 (UK), 25 Edw I c 7. This form of dower is further discussed at note 39. 
23 Toward, supra note 20 at 1-2. Citing the 1670 An Act for the Better Settling of Intestates Estates, 1670 (UK), 22 & 
23 Charles II c 10, s 5, where a widow was entitled to one third if surviving children, and half if no issue; 
Sherrin, supra note 13 at 42. 
24 Statute of Westminster II, 1285 (UK), 13 Edw I c 34. 
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dower, since it was considered “an offence of ecclesiastical jurisdiction only, and of 
which the Courts of common law took no cognizance.”25 Lord Chief Justice Tindal 
deliberated that the condition was likely added due to concerns about a woman “intro-
ducing a supposititious offspring into the family,” although no parallel legislation 
threatened a husband’s curtesy for identical conduct.26  
The Custom of Curtesy 
While a widow had a conditional right to her dower, a widower had his own unique 
relationship with the estate of his intestate wife. This relationship was based upon the 
common law estate of curtesy, or a husband’s absolute entitlement to his wife’s personal 
property, and a life estate over “the entirety of land and hereditaments of the wife of 
which she was seised for an estate of inheritance.”27  
However, curtesy was conditional upon his wife giving birth to a living child that 
could someday be eligible to inherit the property she was seised of.28 Therefore, it ap-
pears that the purpose of curtesy was to ensure that children would receive their 
maternal inheritance, through ensuring that the husband would “prevent it from being 
squandered.”29 Yet it has also been reported that if the child predeceased the mother, 
the husband’s life estate of curtesy remained intact, and her property would not revert 
back to her own family. This is a discrepancy that favoured patrilineage rather than mat-
rilineage, and enhanced property rights or wealth amongst the husband’s lineage, despite 
the wife’s death clearly terminating feme covert.30 
4. DISCONTENT AND DEBATE 
Discontent with Traditional Intestate Succession Mechanisms 
As the above outline highlights, the common law’s traditional treatment of intestate 
estates was predominately influenced by an individual’s gender. Beyond growing calls 
for women’s suffrage into the nineteenth century, the merits of primogeniture, as well as 
the effectiveness of dower and curtesy, were increasingly the focus of political and soci-
etal debate.  
Political Reform after Discontent with Primogeniture and Intestacy Provisions 
In Upper Canada, discontent with traditional means of addressing intestacy took 
root in eighteen different proposals to abolish primogeniture between 1820 and 1851, 
yet the Legislative Assembly ultimately blocked these requests.31 Similarly, in December 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Hetherington v Graham (1829), 6 Bing 135. As reported in The Law Journal, vol 7 (London: 1829) at 254.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Toward, supra note 20 at 40-41, 8.  
28 Ibid at 40-41. 
29 Chambers, supra note 10 at 20. 
30 Toward, supra note 20 at 42. In reference to FE Farrer, “Tenant by the Curtesy of England” (1927) 43 Law 
Q Rev 7 at 92. 
31 Buck, supra note 19 at 178. 
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1821, during the second session of the 8th Parliament of Upper Canada, Mr. Barnabas 
Bidwell moved to bring an Act forward regarding intestate estates, but the proposed 
legislation was voted down by a majority to six.32  
The refusal to support Mr. Bidwell’s proposed legislation may have been predomi-
nantly political, as Mr. Bidwell was soon expelled from the Legislative Assembly due to 
outstanding criminal charges in New Hampshire.33 Furthermore, the debates regarding 
primogeniture were often accompanied by accusations that abolishment of the doctrine 
was “anti-British,” since the custom had been struck down in the United States and its 
removal was associated with “republican values.”34 However, when legislation address-
ing intestacy reforms came to the Legislative Assembly on December 19, 1823, it 
quickly moved to committee after being introduced by Mr. John Wilson of Wentworth. 
By 1851, the right of primogeniture was also abolished in Upper Canada.35 
Discontent with Dower and Partial Political Reform 
A widow’s right to dower was also controversial in Upper Canada, and was criti-
cized by those holding title to property influenced by it. As a wife’s dower interest was 
“etched” into the husband’s land upon marriage, and her permission was required to 
convey the property, dower was described as a “blot on the title” that ultimately made 
the property less amenable to conveyancing or prone to being undervalued.36  
Similarly, those who sought to enforce dower criticized the doctrine. Such criti-
cisms may be linked to the difficulty widows had accessing their dower, despite its 
pronouncement in statute; for instance, in 1225 twenty percent of the pleas on the Roy-
al Court’s Roll were related to claims for dower.37 Even once enforced, dower was 
criticized as failing to support many of the widows it was intended to assist. The Cana-
dian legal community probed this critique, and in 1857 the editors of the Upper Canada 
Law Journal released a harsh appraisal of the doctrine, stating: 
[The Widow] claims dower. What is that? The third part of her husband’s 
lands for life. Of what use is the third part of 100 acres without a house upon 
it, to a widow without means? Sell it…she cannot. Till it…she cannot. Eat 
it…she cannot. Truly, the widow asks for bread; but the law gives her a 
stone. She wants “sustenance” or that which will provide sustenance for 
her—in other words she wants money… So far the law practically fails to 
give that which it professes to give—the required relief.38 
Despite these critiques and concerns, a widow’s statutory right to dower was not to 
be abolished or replaced in Upper Canada, but instead underwent various reforms. For 
example, in 1859 the Legislative Assembly’s Act Respecting Dower abolished a non-
                                                                                                                                            
32 Upper Canada, Legislative Assembly, The Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada for the Years 1821, 
1822, 1823, 1824, 8th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol 6, (11 December 1821) (Barnabus Bidwell). 
33 “A Day in Canada’s History”, Saskatoon Star-Phoenix (16 November, 1931) 1. 
34 Buck, supra note 19 at 178-179. 
35 Upper Canada, Legislative Assembly, The Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada for the Years 1821, 
1822, 1823, 1824, 8th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol 6, (14, 19 December 1823) (John Wilson).  
36 Philip Girard, “Land law, Liberalism and the Agrarian Ideal: British North America, 1750-1920” in 
McLaren, Buck & Wright, supra note 10 ch 6 at 123-124. 
37 Walker, supra note 12 at 3. 
38 Wright, supra note 10 at 191, n 6. Citing “The Law of Dower” (1857) 3 UCLJ 209 at 209. 
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statutory form of dower, dower ad ostium ecclesio, or “Dowry at the Church door.”39 Dower 
ad ostium ecclesio was a husband’s public declaration of dower after the wedding, which 
could be no more than one third of his property—although it could be less.40 Therefore, 
by abolishing this form of dower, the Act Respecting Dower standardized a wife’s interest 
to a firm one-third of the husband’s estate. Similarly, sections 6 and 7 of the Act Respect-
ing Dower attempted to protect wives from being coerced into signing away their dower 
rights when a husband sought to convey his property. These sections required that a 
wife be examined by a judge to “check for involuntariness or coercion by part of her 
husband or another party.”41 In the following decades, other substantial reforms oc-
curred through the 1882 Married Woman’s Property Act, in which a wife could bar her 
husband from curtesy inter vivos or through her Will, and through the Devolution of Estates 
Act.42  
5. A FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION TO INTESTACY 
The Introduction of “Preferential Share” in 1895 
Political Context 
In 1894, Oliver Mowat, the longstanding Premier and leader of the Ontario Liberal 
Party, opened the 8th Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Despite his deep Presbyterian 
roots, he promoted the separation of Church and State, and believed that “there must 
be a constant reformation, if there is to be a constant progress.”43  
Mowat’s support for reforms regarding women were likely impacted by his “canny 
sensitivity to public opinion” and the public’s association between the rights that a 
woman should enjoy and her marital status.44 For example, despite suffering a loss of 
seats in the 1884 election, his party was confident in promoting and securing municipal 
suffrage for widows that owned property. However, in 1889 Mowat still refused to lob-
by for a married woman’s right to vote—even though he personally thought that many 
concerns and arguments against women’s suffrage were “trivial.”45  
At first, the distinction seems clear: while the public would tolerate legislating new 
rights for the feme sole, there was still a reluctance to threaten a husband’s coverture and 
enfranchise the feme covert. Despite this distinction regarding a woman’s suffrage, it does 
not appear that this public concern extended to legislating the property of a feme covert or 
feme sole. After all, Mowat, possibly not foreseeing any political firestorm, was keen to 
personally introduce the first reading of the Married Woman’s Property Act in 1882.46  
                                                                                                                                            
39 An Act Respecting Dower, 22 Vict, s 3; An Act Respecting Dower, Upper Canada Statutes Consolidated 1859, cap 
84. This Act also abolished dower ex assensu partis.  
40 Richard Thomson, An Historical Essay on the Magna Charta of King John (London: 1829) at 148. 
41 An Act Respecting Dower, supra note 39, ss 6-7. 
42 Sherrin, supra note 13 at 34; Devolution of Estates Act, 49 Vict c 22. 
43 Margaret Evans, Sir Oliver Mowat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) at 25, 28. 
44 Ibid at 304. 
45 Ibid at 306, 304, 15. 
46 Ibid at 29. This bill also included “Spinsters,” or women who had never married, as they also classified as 
feme sole. 
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Bill 118, “An Act making better Provisions for Widows of Intestates in  
Certain Cases” 
On March 15, 1895, Premier Mowat introduced another piece of legislation that 
addressed a woman’s property interests: Bill 118, “An Act making better Provisions for 
Widows of Intestates in Certain Cases,” or The Intestates’ Estates Act, based upon the 
British Intestate Estates Act of 1890.47 It operated as its own distinct entity, instead of 
amending the Devolution of Estates Act, the Dower Act, or any other legislation containing 
intestacy provisions, and was thus a visible and prominent legislative proposal.48 Even 
so, the Bill’s importance did not attract significant debate, and by April 16, 1895, Bill 
118 effortlessly received Royal Assent, along with 126 other bills, on the final day of the 
First Session of Ontario’s 8th Parliament.49  
Despite its uncontroversial passage through the Ontario Legislature, The Intestates’ 
Estates Act substantially altered a widow’s legal relationship with the estate of her intes-
tate husband through three core sections.50 Section 2 ensured that if an intestate 
husband did not have children, and his estate had a net value that did not exceed $1000, 
his entire estate would go to his widow “absolutely and exclusively.” If the estate had a 
net value that exceeded $1000, then section 3 outlined that after the payment “of debts, 
funeral and testamentary expenses and expenses of the administrator,” the widow 
would again be able to obtain $1000 absolutely and exclusively. Finally, section 4 speci-
fied that this $1000 “shall be in addition and without prejudice” to her interest in the 
residue of the estate. 
The Intestates’ Estates Act therefore fundamentally changed how a widow’s inher-
itance is conceptualized. Under the preferential share model, a widow’s inheritance 
commenced with a fixed interest of $1000 (if the estate had a net value able to provide 
this) and then an additional interest in the remainder of the estate. This is in sharp con-
trast with dower, in which there was no absolute financial interest, and the widow was 
only entitled to a third of whatever her husband’s estate happened to be worth.  
The Response: The Undeserving Widow 
Despite this conceptual shift, the introduction of The Intestates’ Estates Act at the 
Legislative Assembly was initially a quiet affair. On the day after it was introduced, The 
Globe’s headline was focused on the guilty verdict in a murder case, and the parties’ up-
coming hanging; however, the updates from the Legislature did mention Bill 118, 
including a brief description of its purpose:  
                                                                                                                                            
47 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, vol 28 (15 
March 1895) at 52 (Oliver Mowat). The Act was based on the 1890 British Intestate Estates Act, 1890 (UK), 53 
and 54 Vict c 29, as later clarified by case law such as Re Charriere, Duret v Charriere, [1896] 1 Ch 912, as report-
ed by Henry O’Brien, ed, for 32 Can LJ at 548 [Charriere]. 
48 MacWilliams v MacWilliams, [1962] OR 407 at para 15, 32 DLR (2d) 481 (Ont CA) [MacWilliams]. 
49 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, vol 28 (16 April 
1895) at 165.  
50 An Act making better Provisions for Widows of Intestates in Certain Cases, 58 Vict, c 21, s 3 [The Intestates’ Estates 
Act]. Using the consumer price index to adjust for inflation, a $1000 estate in 1895 would have a present day 
value of approximately $20,300 CAD. 
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[T]o provide that where a man dies intestate without issue his widow shall be 
able to claim up to $1000, and that the divisions among relatives under the 
law as present shall not take place except [if] the estate exceeds that sum.51  
The Bill’s second reading and amendments recommended by committee also received 
no coverage. Its seemingly uncontroversial nature is captured by The Globe’s description 
of its third reading, remarking that “a number of third readings were discharged when 
the House met, the bills thus practically becoming law being the Attorney-General’s to 
make better provision for the widows of intestates in certain cases.”52 Regarding its 
Royal Assent on the last day before the formal prorogation of the Legislature, The 
Globe’s coverage only emphasized that the closing ceremonies were the “quietest event 
of the kind which has happened for some years” with less than half the members’ seats 
being occupied.53 
It took several months for the new legislation to be fully noticed and debated on 
record. In November 1895, seven months after The Intestates’ Estates Act was proclaimed 
into law, the editors of The Canada Law Journal received the following questions: 
Wherein is the sense of justice of this latest creature of the Solons of the  
Local Legislature? If a wife does her duty, or raises children, she gets nothing 
special; if she provides no issue, she gets $1,000 clear. Does one farrow cow 
get all the pasture?54  
In response, the editors concurred by stating that “[w]hilst it was right to make some 
provision for the widow who had no children” they also did not understand why a wife 
with children “should be so much ignored.” The editors subsequently dismissed the 
legislation as part of the “great clamour” for various reforms across the country, and 
suggested that if it was indeed based on English statute “it does not necessarily follow 
that it is the essence of wisdom” anyways.55  
These comments invoke a harsh criticism of a widow without children, and frame 
her not as a full and legitimate heir, but as a woman of lesser concern than a widow with 
children. The sentiments correlate to deep societal conceptions of the “good wife” and 
the corresponding “deserving widow,” and their counterparts of the “bad wife” and 
“undeserving widow.” This conceptualization is closely intertwined with a historical 
perspective that tended to blame women for reproductive issues, from infertility to in-
fant mortality.56 Similarly, these comments are linked to the notion, pervasive in the 
nineteenth century, that childbearing was a woman’s marital duty. As phrased by Justice 
Bradley of the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of 
women [is] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of 
the creator.”57 
                                                                                                                                            
51 “The Legislature”, The Globe (16 March 1895) 1, 7. 
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54 “Editorial Times” (1 November 1895) 31:17 Can LJ at 556-557. 
55 Ibid. 
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Incorporation into the Devolution of Estates Act 
In the face of such criticism, the provisions outlining preferential share in The Intes-
tates’ Estates Act were repealed in 1897, but only so they could be incorporated into the 
Devolution of Estates Act through sections 12(1)–(3).58 The new concept of preferential 
share had to have its formal relationship with dower clarified, as these provisions sud-
denly existed side by side in the same piece of legislation. This clarification was 
accomplished through section 4(2) in the Devolution of Estates Act, which outlined the 
relationship between preferential share and dower as follows: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to take away a widow’s right to dower; 
but a widow may by deed or instrument in writing, attested by at least one 
witness, elect to take her interest under this section in her husband’s undis-
posed of real estate, in lieu of all claims to dower…and unless she so elects 
she shall not be entitled to share under this section in the undisposed of real 
estate aforesaid.59 
This section results in a widow having to elect to take her preferential share in lieu of 
dower, with the default assumption being her inclination for dower, as pronounced 
under section 4(2). Thus, despite the introduction of a fundamentally new means of 
dividing an intestate estate, a widow’s traditional right to dower still stood. 
Acceptance by the Courts 
Despite the criticism of preferential share and dower alike in Ontario, the courts 
upheld both dower and preferential share in the context of their new relationship out-
lined in section 4(2) of the Devolution of Estates Act. One such instance occurred in 1898, 
where Justice Role used a strict reading of the preferential share provision in Sinclair v 
Brown, and confirmed that a widow was entitled to $1000 out of the husband’s estate in 
Ontario, regardless of her potential inheritance from other jurisdictions.60 The court 
also strictly limited the availability of preferential share to cases of absolute intestacy. 
For example, in re Harrison, the court did not allow for the exchange of dower for a dis-
tributive interest as there was only “intestacy in part,” and thus barred the widow from a 
$1000 interest.61 
Contrary to these strict interpretations, Justice C. Boyd did generously interpret the 
ability of a widow to elect her preferential share in lieu of dower in Baker v Stuart.62 In 
this case, the widow assumed her dower, but a year later sought to exchange her dower 
for a preferential share. The court noted that the Devolution of Estates Act was silent re-
garding the time permitted for election, unlike a widower’s election for curtesy, which 
                                                                                                                                            
58 Schedule A – Acts and parts of Acts Repealed, RSO 1897, at 3657; An Act respecting the Devolution of Estates, RSO 
1897 c 127, s 12(1)-(3); MacWilliams, supra note 48 at 25. 
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vol 18 (Toronto: Carswell Co Limited Publishers, 1899) at 239. 
61 Re Harrison, (1901) 21 Occ N 478, 2 OLR 217. As referenced by E Douglas Armour & EB Brown, eds, The 
Canadian Law Times (Toronto: Carswell Co Limited Publishers, 1901) at 196. 
62 E Douglas Armour & EB Brown, eds, The Canadian Law Times, vol 18 (Toronto: Carswell Co Limited Pub-
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12 A HISTORY OF PREFERENTIAL SHARE IN ONTARIO Vol. 23 
	  
only stood for six months.63 As a result, the court held that since the remainder of the 
estate had not yet been distributed, the widow was free to alter her decision and elect 
for a preferential share.64  
It is difficult to determine the judiciary’s exact opinion of this reform and the in-
troduction of a preferential share. As preferential share was based upon the British 
Intestate’s Estates Act, adherence to the legislation may have been based upon its strict 
enforcement in the motherland, such as the judgment in Duret v Charriere.65  
6. LIMITATIONS AND PROGRESS 
Review of the Preferential Share Reforms 
For a vast majority of widows, the ability to elect between her dower and a prefer-
ential share would have been a beneficial reform to intestacy provisions—particularly 
for those not insulated by a family trust, or those whose husband’s estate was worth less 
than the preferential share threshold of $1000. However, for some subgroups of wid-
ows, the appearance of empowerment through an ability to elect a preferential share 
could be somewhat misleading. This was the case for widows accused of adultery, those 
deemed to have an “unsound mind,” or widows with children.  
Influence of Adultery 
As noted, the 1285 Statute of Westminster II maintained that a widow would be dis-
qualified from obtaining dower should she be adulterous, a condition that remained 
under the Dower Act of 1297 and under the 1970 revised version of this statute in sec-
tion 8, which states: 
Where a wife willingly leaves her husband and goes away and continues with 
her adulterer, she is barred forever of her action to demand her dower… 
unless her husband willingly and without coercion is reconciled to her and 
suffers her to dwell with him, in which case she is restored to her action.66 
Ontario case law demonstrates that adultery could also bar a widow from her preferen-
tial share, even though adultery is not specifically addressed in the Devolution of Estates 
Act. For example, in 1962 Justice Kelly for the Ontario Court of Appeal stressed that 
the preferential share provisions of the Devolution of Estates Act were only accessible if a 
widow elected for a preferential share in lieu of her dower; however, an adulterous widow 
“is precluded from making an effective choice” since her conduct has disentitled her 
from her dower prima facie.67 As a result, the widow in MacWilliams v MacWilliams was 
prevented from claiming her preferential share, since this interest could only be ob-
                                                                                                                                            
63 Ibid at 175. 
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65 Charriere, supra note 47. 
66 Dower Act, RSO 1970, c135, s 8 [Dower Act 1970]. 
67 MacWilliams, supra note 48 at 24-25. 
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tained in exchange for her dower, which she lost upon her engagement in adultery.68 Of 
course, the language of section 8 of the Dower Act is problematic, as it only addresses the 
impact of a wife’s adultery on her election of her dower or preferential share—there is 
no parallel provision barring an adulterous husband from his estate of curtesy.  
The basis for such a discrepancy can be found in differing perceptions of male and 
female adultery during the early twentieth century, including the contention that a hus-
band’s infidelity was less offensive to the marital union since he “impose[d] no bastards 
upon his wife.”69 Submissions to the British Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes in 1912 also argued that the husband’s adultery was less significant due to it being 
“more or less accidental” and ultimately the fault of immoral women in his company.70 
In addition, a woman that fled an abusive spouse and sought non-adulterous shelter 
would surely struggle to secure her dower and ability to elect her preferential share 
against accusations of infidelity.  
Lunacy or an “Unsound Mind” 
Another classification that could impair a wife’s ability to claim dower or her pref-
erential share was “lunacy,” as noted in various sections of the Dower Act of 1914. For 
example, in section 14(b) a husband seeking to sell land with a wife confined to a “hos-
pital for the insane” could apply for a summary order to dispense with his wife’s 
permission to bar her dower.71 Similarly, if the wife was not confined to an asylum, a 
husband could have a doctor certify his medical opinion of lunacy, thus allowing a judge 
to accept an application to bar her dower under section 15(1).72  
While a wife permanently confided to an asylum could conceivably not require ei-
ther her dower or preferential share, these provisions are nonetheless problematic from 
a gender-based analysis. Once again, the gender-specific language of this legislation only 
made wives vulnerable to these provisions. The application to bar dower under section 
15 had to be completed within a month of the medical certification’s completion; as a 
result, a wife had an incredibly short window of opportunity to contest certification.73 
Under section 10(1) of the Lunacy Act of 1914, a wife or widow had to wait a year to 
challenge certification, unless provided with leave of the court. Section 14 of the Dower 
Act also appears to lack any conception of a wife recovering from her mental affliction, 
leaving an asylum, or ever requiring her full dower in the future. 
Yet a wife accused of lunacy or an unsound mind was offered some protection by 
section 7(1) of the Lunacy Act of 1914, since lunacy had to be established “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”74 Of course, reasonable doubt was only as valid as what was classi-
fied as “lunacy.” Even in the revised 1970 version of the Dower Act, section 13(1)(c) 
considered a wife suffering from epilepsy to be of an “unsound mind.”75 Likewise, in 
                                                                                                                                            
68 Ibid. 
69 FP Walton, “Divorce in England, the United States and Canada” (1913) 22:7 Yale LJ 531 at 534.  
70 Ibid at 534. However, it is interesting to note from Walton’s report that in contrast, adulterous conduct 
would be deemed “very deliberate” if the conduct occurred with a “pure woman,” through an additional 
emphasis on the reputation of the woman, rather than the man, involved in adultery. 
71 Dower Act, RSO 1914, c 70, s 13(1). 
72 Ibid, s 15(1). 
73 Ibid, s 15(2). 
74 Lunacy Act, RSO 1914 c 68, s 7(1). 
75 Dower Act 1970, supra note 66, s 13(1)(c). 
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the 1820s two women were reportedly confined to the Massachusetts’ McLean Asylum 
For the Insane after they “confessed to despising their husbands.”76 This has led some 
authors to argue that it was “relatively easy to get troublesome or eccentric individuals 
admitted to the insane asylums,” and that institutional confinement was a “convenient 
and culturally legitimate alternative to coping with ‘intolerable’ individuals within the 
family.”77 Therefore one can conclude that while an uncommon occurrence, wives and 
widows could be incredibly vulnerable to the burgeoning discipline of psychiatry in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and could lose access to both their dower 
and preferential share as a result. 
Women with Children 
The longstanding terminology of preferential share provisions, employed from 
1895 to 1970, meant that preferential share only applied to a widow with no issue.78 
Therefore, another sub-group of women that could be barred from their access to pref-
erential share were those with issue, meaning they had children with their now deceased 
spouse. As noted above, in re Harrison, this reading of the provision was also firmly up-
held by the courts. Thus, a widow’s options regarding intestacy were dramatically 
impacted by the presence of children: widows without children could elect a preferential 
share in lieu of dower, and ensure they gained access to the option which provided 
them with the greatest benefit. In contrast, widows with children were barred from this 
choice, and could only rely on their dower. 
Such distinctions between widows with or without children were likely based upon 
societal assumptions about a woman’s support system upon widowhood. For example, 
it was often assumed that a widow without children would have limited assistance, and 
thus require a preferential share. In contrast, a widow with children would be expected 
to rely upon her adult children, as any “good wife” who produced her husband heirs 
would be entitled to an adult child’s good faith and financial support.79 In addition, a 
widow with dependent children was expected to reside with her matrilineal family.80 
However, Cynthia Curran found that in Victorian England these assumptions often 
failed to hold true, and that rather than remarrying or living with relatives, 68% of wid-
ows were the head of their households.81  
Widows with or without children also had distinct experiences from their male 
counterparts. For example, as noted above, a widower would obtain a life interest over 
his wife’s property and real estate if a child was born through an estate of curtesy. 
Moreover, a widower was not similarly impacted by the pervasive Victorian ideal of 
“separate spheres” for men and women, whereby men were permitted to work outside 
the home and women were relegated to the domestic realm. As a result, widows with or 
                                                                                                                                            
76 E Fuller Torrey & Judy Miller, The Invisible Plague : the Rise of Mental Illness from 1750 to the Present (Toronto: 
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78 The Intestates’ Estates Act, supra note 50, s 2. 
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without children typically found it difficult to locate employment outside the home that 
would lift them beyond “bare subsistence.”82 
Nonetheless, the distinction between widows with or without issue was reaffirmed, 
rather than reformed, in 1966 through the Act to Amend the Devolution of Estates Act. 
Through this amendment an apparent “loophole” was closed, and it was clarified that 
the ability to elect a preferential share “do[es] not apply to the surviving spouse of a 
person who dies intestate and is survived by one or more infant children by a former marriage” 
[emphasis added].83  
Progressive commentators in 1895 would have been dismayed to learn that legisla-
tive reform regarding the perceived injustice to the “farrow cow” only occurred in 1977 
with the advent of the Succession Law Reform Act. Under section 45(1) a widow with issue 
is now able to access the preferential share provision, while section 46(1)–(2) of the 
Succession Law Reform Act explicitly outlines the division of the residue between the wid-
ow and children.84 However, access to preferential share no longer comes in lieu of 
dower; instead, it comes at the expense of dower due to the repeal of both the Dower 
Act and the Devolution of Estates Act by 1978.85 Despite this reform, the 1895 commenta-
tor might have still disliked the Succession Law Reform Act because section 44 has actually 
granted the widow without issue an even greater interest than preferential share in her 
intestate spouse’s estate: she is now “entitled to the property absolutely.”86  Then again, 
the commentator might be appeased by the 1960 amendments to the Devolution of Estates 
Act. These reforms gave a widower access to his own preferential share thanks to the 
gender-neutral nature of the terminology “spouse” in the Succession Law Reform Act, de-
spite the 1977 abolition of curtesy.87 
7. MODERN-DAY PREFERENTIAL SHARE: LOVE AND (LESS) MARRIAGE 
Expanding Access to Preferential Share: Widowers, Same-Sex & Polygamous 
Couples 
Since its introduction in 1895, access to a preferential share has consistently been 
extended to other sub-groups of spouses who would benefit from this provision. As 
noted above, the 1977 amendments to the Succession Law Reform Act expanded this bene-
fit to widows with issue and to widowers, reflecting a more gender-neutral appreciation 
for the nature of marriage and widowhood. In addition, section 6(2) of the Family Law 
Act now permits a surviving spouse to elect either their preferential share or equaliza-
tion payment of net family property after the death of their intestate partner—an 
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important development that will protect spouses entitled to an equalization payment in 
excess of $200,000 before widowhood.88 
In 1990, the legislation also amended the definition of “spouse” to include those 
engaged in a polygamous marriage, as long as the union originated in a jurisdiction that 
legally recognized this marriage structure.89 After same-sex marriages were legally recog-
nized in 2003 after the Ontario Court of Appeal Decision of Halpern v Canada, the 
definition of “spouse” was also updated from “a man and woman” to “two persons” 
who are lawfully married. However, this amendment did not occur until March 2005, 
several months before the passage of the Civil Marriage Act in July 2005.90 Overall, these 
amendments reflect a progressive and purposive expansion of this benefit to a broader 
range of individuals impacted by the hardships associated with intestacy and the death 
of a spouse. These modern amendments have also moved into a gender-neutral framing 
that distances itself from the provision’s historical emphasis on a conceptual dichotomy 
between the “good wife and deserving widow” and the “bad wife and undeserving wid-
ow.”  
Exclusion of Common-Law Spouses in Ontario 
Unfortunately, despite the above amendments which promote an expanded defini-
tion of who is considered a spouse under the Succession Law Reform Act, and therefore 
considered entitled to a preferential share, a significant and growing portion of Ontar-
io’s population is still excluded: common-law spouses. Specifically, the Succession Law 
Reform Act does not provide any automatic consideration to a surviving common-law 
spouse after the death of his or her intestate partner, regardless of how long the rela-
tionship existed, or the level of dependency of one spouse upon the other, as section 
1(1) of the legislation only extends this benefit to those who are lawfully married or in a 
void or voidable marriage that was entered into in good faith.91 
In light of the consistent expansion of access to a preferential share benefit, the 
continued exclusion of common-law spouses is a sharp contrast to the recent inclusion-
ary trend. This exclusion is also notable due to the increasing prevalence of common-
law unions in Canada. For example, in 2011 Statistics Canada recorded that common-
law couples accounted for 16.7% of Canadian families, or 1,567,910 households.92 In 
addition, between 2006 and 2011 the number of common-law couples increased by 
13.9%—a growth rate that was four times greater than the increase in married couples.93 
This growth is also mirrored by a decline in married couples overall: in 1961 married 
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couples comprised 91.6% of families in Canada, and by 2011 Statistics Canada observed 
a decrease to 67% of all families.94 
Exclusion and Potential Stigma associated with Cohabitating Couples 
Due to the decrease in marriage rates and an increase in common-law households, 
a growing percentage of the population in Ontario will not have access to a preferential 
share of their intestate partner’s estate. The decision to exclude common-law spouses or 
cohabitating couples from obtaining a preferential share is controversial. Proponents for 
the exclusion prefer the current “opt-in” format, where couples express their autonomy 
through the deliberate choice of marriage, and explicitly signal their desire to grant the 
surviving partner an interest in the estate.95 In contrast, those who promote the inclu-
sion of common-law spouses promote an “opt-out” structure, in which cohabitating 
couples are granted an automatic interest in the estate by default, while providing a 
mechanism for those who object to exit the scheme.96  
The current preference for an opt-in format, and the exclusion of common-law or 
cohabiting couples unless and until they marry, may exist for reasons beyond advocating 
for personal choice and autonomy when conferring an interest in one’s estate. Rather, it 
appears that the exclusion of common-law or cohabitating couples may still be associat-
ed with conceptions of the deserving or undeserving partner. These exclusions now 
operate as an expression of stigma and disapproval of those who fail to adhere to socie-
tal expectations of entering a traditional marriage.  
Empirical investigations demonstrate a clear stigma against those who remain single 
and fail to marry, despite the growing number of individuals who either marry later in 
life, or who simply never walk down the aisle.97 For example, a 2005 study by Bella De-
Paulo and Wendy Morris argued that those who do not marry encounter a unique form 
of discrimination, or singlism, derived from the “pervasive ideology of marriage and 
family, manifested in everyday thoughts, interactions, laws, and social policies that fa-
vour couples over singles.”98 Specifically, singlism reflects the broad societal myth that 
everyone wants to be married, and that they will eventually be married—unless they pos-
sess some deep and personal flaw.99 
Yet singlism and the stigma around failing to marry are not easily transposed onto 
common-law relationships. In fact, merely being in a long-term romantic relationship 
and cohabitating in a relationship that is similar in nature to marriage may actually di-
minish any such stigma. Previous notions that only marriage bestows “dignity and 
respectability” and that cohabitation is the clear “absence of such desirable qualities” 
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appear to be fading over time.100 For example, the “Linda LeClair Affair” of 1968, in 
which a female college student violated university housing rules by living off-campus 
with her boyfriend, would hardly make the same national headlines today—and the idea 
that this student would be banned from the school cafeteria, prohibited from attending 
certain social events and eventually expelled for cohabitating now seems nothing short 
of an incredibly ridiculous and excessive punishment.101 
Nonetheless, Professor Elizabeth Pleck of Illinois University argues that the stigma 
against cohabitation has not disappeared. In support of her argument she cites a 2010 
Pew Trust poll in the United States, which found that 43% of respondents considered 
cohabitation to be negative, 13% had no opinion, and 44% possessed favourable atti-
tudes.102 Pleck also notes that there was a strong double standard in the way that 
women are perceived in cohabitation arrangements; women who were in common-law 
relationships were more likely to be labeled with negative terms such as “tramp” or 
“gold digger” than their male counterparts.103 In addition, Pleck notes that cohabitating 
women are often regarded in a negative light in family courts and are “punished by los-
ing custody of their children.” By contrast, judges “hold divorced fathers with live-in 
girlfriends to a ‘lower’ moral standard.”104  
Decrease in Stigmatization against Common-Law Couples 
Pleck’s findings focus on American-based research, which also found that negative 
attitudes toward cohabitating couples were most prominent within segments of the 
population that are older, more religious, and living in the most conservative areas of 
the United States.105 Couples that have cohabitated for longer periods of time tend to 
self-report that the stigma they experience regarding their relationship structure “is 
much less than it was a decade ago,” as cohabitation becomes more accepted and com-
mon place.106 
There is evidence to suggest that any lingering stigma against common-law couples 
in the United States does not clearly reflect the social reality in Canada. For example, in 
the 2013 decision of Attorney General of Quebec v A, the Supreme Court of Canada casted 
doubt on the notion that there is prevalent discrimination against common-law couples 
in Canadian society. Specifically, the court noted that: 
Nothing in the evidence suggests that de facto [common-law] spouses are now 
subject to public opprobrium or that they are otherwise subject to social os-
tracism.  
The expert reports filed by the parties tend to show the contrary. According 
to them, the de facto union has become a respected type of conjugality and is 
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not judged unfavourably… [Nor do the expert reports] support a view that 
society continues to be suspicious or intolerant of de facto unions.107 
In addition, the court highlighted the value of the “opt-in” format and its ability to pro-
vide common-law couples with both the choice and opportunity to structure their 
relationship in a format other than traditional marriage.108 As a result, it appears that at 
present the courts and the Ontario legislature are satisfied that the exclusion of com-
mon-law couples from the preferential share provision is neither discriminatory, nor the 
result of social stigma against this population. The general absence of such stigma 
would suggest that this exclusion is not intentionally being used to turn preferential 
share into a reward for entering a traditional marriage, adhering to traditional gender 
roles, or being the “good wife and deserving widow.” 
British Columbia and Inclusion under the Estates Administration Act 
Due to the present exclusion of common-law couples from accessing an automatic 
preferential share in Ontario, a surviving partner may pursue various other remedies 
through the courts. For example, within Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, section 
57(1) expressly defines “spouse” in a manner that includes common-law partners, 
thereby allowing a surviving partner to apply for a dependant support claim against the 
deceased’s estate.109 In addition, a common-law spouse could make equitable claims 
against the estate through claims for unjust enrichment, or a constructive or resulting 
trust. Unfortunately, these alternatives require not only the time and expense of a judi-
cial application or hearing, but also depend upon the surviving partner’s awareness of 
their potential entitlements and their overcoming evidential issues. 
In contrast, British Columbia has engaged an “opt-out” format that includes a 
common-law spouse within intestate inheritance, including an automatic entitlement to 
a preferential share. Section 1 of the Estates Administration Act defines “spouse” as in-
cluding a common-law spouse, or “a person who has lived and cohabited with another 
person, in a marriage-like relationship…for a period of at least 2 years immediately be-
fore the other person’s death.”110 In addition, common-law partners are included in the 
preferential share scheme under section 85(1)–(3), which states that the spouse of an 
intestate will receive the entirety of the estate if its net value is less than $65,000.111 The-
se provisions will continue once the new Wills, Estates and Succession Act comes into force 
in March 2014, after the corresponding repeal of the Estate Administration Act.112  
As a result, despite the apparent lack of stigma or discrimination against common-
law partners driving their exclusion from the preferential share provision in Ontario, a 
more protective and purposive reading of the spirit of the legislation would seemingly 
                                                                                                                                            
107 Attorney General of Quebec v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 249, 354 DLR (4th) 191. This case is commonly referred 
to as “Eric v Lola” in the Canadian media. 
108 Ibid at para 449. 
109 SLRA 1990, supra note 5, s 57(1)(b). Specifically, a common-law spouse can pursue a dependant support 
claim if the couple cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years, or were in a relationship 
of some permanence and if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child. 
110 Estate Administration Act, RSBC 1996, c 122, s 1. 
111 Ibid, s 85(1)-(3). 
112 Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13, s (1)-(2): coming into force on March 31, 2014 (see BC Reg 
148/2013). 
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encourage the province to follow in British Columbia’s footsteps. Adopting an “opt-
out” structure, which avoids a dependant support claim or other judicial application by a 
vulnerable and grieving partner, would also continue to develop the preferential share 
provision in a progressive manner. This would emphasize the overall relationship and 
dependency between two partners, rather than their gender, marital status, and lingering 
conceptions of the “good wife and deserving widow” or the “bad wife and undeserving 
widow.” 
8. THE LAST LEGISLATION STANDING 
Reflections on the Preferential Share under the Succession Law Reform Act 
With the repeal of both the Dower Act and the Devolution of Estates Act by 1978, the 
Succession Law Reform Act is now one of Ontario’s central pieces of legislation addressing 
intestacy provisions. As noted above, the legislation regarding intestacy in Upper Cana-
da, up until present-day Ontario, has undergone significant reform and 
reconceptualization. Most notably, this essay has explored the introduction of the pref-
erential share provision in the “Act making better Provisions for Widows of Intestates 
in Certain Cases.”  
Like its predecessors, the preferential share model received harsh criticism, particu-
larly in regards to concepts of the “bad wife” or “undeserving widow,” since the 
provision was only accessible for women without issue. Many sub-groups of widows 
were left vulnerable despite this reform—including but not limited to those accused of 
adultery, suspected of lunacy, or with children—as preferential share still embraced “the 
power of the state to reinforce patriarchal control over households.”113 
Overall, the fundamental conceptual shift into a preferential share model preceded 
other important reforms. First, it recognized the importance of a base level of financial 
support required for widows, rather than the traditional dower as a percentage of the 
estate. Accordingly, the threshold of the preferential share has been amended numerous 
times, including an increase to $20,000 in 1960, $75,000 in 1977, and finally $200,000 in 
1995.114 Second, the original option to elect one’s preferential share helped to diffuse 
the traditional rigidity of dower for many widows and empowered the widow to choose 
which benefit structure suited her unique situation. Third, preferential share offered a 
conceptual stepping-stone from intestacy entitlements based exclusively on gender to a 
gender-neutral entitlement emphasizing core financial needs of the surviving spouse. 
Most importantly, as protected under statute, preferential share provided a power-
ful counterweight to the sharp conceptual dichotomy between the “good wife and 
deserving widow” and the “bad wife and undeserving widow.” Through The Intestates’ 
Estates Act of 1895, Premier Mowat’s government simply spelled it out: a widow without 
children is not only deserving of a share of her husband’s estate, but deserving of a pref-
erential share of his estate. This legislative counterweight to societal notions of the 
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“deserving widow” and the “undeserving widow” demonstrates the changing relation-
ships between gender and marital status within intestacy provisions through the nine-
nineteenth century, into the gender-neutral provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act, 
and our gradual societal progression towards equality between the sexes. 
